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A methodology to measure administrative burdens, based on the Dutch Standard 
Cost Model (SCM), has been applied in a large number of European countries, 
coupled in most cases with the commitment to a reduction target. This paper 
compares the application of the method in different national context and 
discusses its weaknesses and strengths against more complete forms of 
evaluation of the adequacy of regulation. The paper also discusses some 
indication arisen during the measurement of administrative burdens through SCM 
in Italy. Our main conclusion is that the SCM is a potentially useful tool and could 
provide motivation for culture change in policymaking. Its major strength, which 
lies mainly in its pragmatic approach and the possibility of commitment on a 
quantitative target, may be at the same time a source of weakness and may 
deliver some misleading results. Also some basic concepts of the model need a 
more rigorous definition to be consistently applied in different countries. 
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“Better regulation” or "better lawmaking" is a complex process that 
covers policy making, from its initial conception through to its appraisal, 
implementation and enforcement (starting with the careful application of the 
principle of subsidiarity) and embraces reform of regulatory policies, 
processes, and Institutions. Better regulation is one the pillars of the Lisbon 
Strategy for growth and jobs. At the same time empirical evidence suggests 
a negative relationship between the intensity of regulation and productivity. 
However, so far the progress achieved were limited due to the complexity of 
the task and the lack of real political support. 
As some commentators have noted (for example Radaelli, 2007), there 
has been some misunderstanding about the real meaning of better 
regulation. While, taken literally, better regulation pointed to an 
improvement in the overall quality of rules (existing and new) based mainly 
on economic analysis (with Regulatory Impact Analysis, RIA), consultation 
and rule making (regulatory management and processes), the term has 
been also used to mean ‘lighter regulation’. This view is implicitly embedded 
for example in many of the cross country indicators that are provided by 
various international institutions
i. The first decade of this century has seen a 
growing interest in this second meaning of better regulation, possibly due to 
increasing scepticism on the possibility of delivering perfect regulation. 
Worries about the costs and burdens of regulation, viewed as sources of 
inefficiencies in the economic system, have become more and more 
important, particularly in Europe (both at member states and EU level). 
Accordingly a growing interest surrounded initiatives to evaluate and cut 
costs of regulation when possible. 
A considerable amount of work has been carried out at the OECD to 
date (OECD, 2003, 2006 and 2007). Some coordination at the EU level 
emerged spontaneously in this area around the Cost Model (SCM). The SCM 
has been developed to provide a simplified, consistent method for 
estimating the administrative burdens imposed on business by public  
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authorities. Initially developed in the Netherlands, the SCM has also been 
extensively applied in Denmark and UK among other countries and is the 
most widely applied methodology for measuring administrative costs. In 
2003, a network of countries was formed to consistently apply the SCM 
across the EU
ii. The initiative has been stepped up by the EU Commission 
with its version of the SCM, the Net Administrative Cost Model (EU-SCM), 
aimed at establishing a common methodology to be used in the EU to 
deliver comparable results
iii.  
From the operational point of view, according to the Dutch manual
iv, 
the researcher should identify the relevant Information Obligation (IO), i.e. 
the piece of information required by the regulation, assess its cost and the 
frequency of the requirement across the economy.  
At the root of this initiatives is a focus on some relatively new notions 
of the burden to be measured that is instrumental to the possibility of 
cutting it afterward. Administrative cost are “… the costs incurred by 
enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authorities and citizens in meeting 
legal obligations to provide information on their activities (or production), 
either to public authorities or to private parties”. It has to be remarked that 
“…  some of the procedures in place  have become needlessly time-
consuming, excessively complicated or useless… Unnecessary and 
disproportionate administrative costs severely hamper economic activity. 
The analysis should distinguish between “information that would be 
collected by businesses even in the absence of the legislation and 
information that would not be collected without the legal provisions. The 
former are called administrative costs; the latter administrative burdens. 
The UK Better Regulation Executive branded the difference between the two 
classes of costs as ‘business as usual’ costs, i.e. costs of activities which 
businesses would be likely to carry out regardless of the regulation in place 
(for example, businesses would continue to keep some type of accounts 
even without legislation, see Coco, 2006 and Torriti, 2007). 
Recently the European Commission underlined the importance of 
measuring the unnecessary administrative burdens (AB) which are likely to  
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“…  hamper growth and inhibit innovation. Removing them will allow 
companies to spend more time on core business activities, thereby increase 
labour efficiency which will benefit productivity and reduce production costs 
…” 
v 
Thus, the SCM is a model designed to identify and quantify the AB 
arising from regulation over a certain period of time, in a way that provides 
insight and detail and allows for comparison of the figures. The tool has a 
microeconomic purpose (is targeted to ex ante impact assessment and ex 
post simplification). The results from the SCM measurements are directly 
applicable in connection with the governments’ simplification efforts, in that 
the results shows which specific regulations and in details which parts of the 
regulation are especially burdensome for businesses. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the EU 
experience and the shift of emphasis towards simplification policies. Section 
3 discusses the Italian measurement (still ongoing) in detail and some 
useful lesson following from it. Section 4 compares exercises conducted in 
different EU countries mainly from a methodological point of view. Section 5 
discusses the overall evidence on the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the SCM as a policy tool. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The EU experience. 
The first initiatives on "better regulation" were launched in the 
Edinburgh European summit of December 1992. The Commission launched 
a multi-annual project in 1996 to streamline key Internal Market Legislation, 
“Simplification of legislation for the internal market” (SLIM). In July 2001 
the Commission committed itself to action on improving the quality of EU 
legislation (White Paper on European Governance), and in June 2002 
adopted an Action Plan "Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment"
vi. In December 2003, an Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) 
on Better Law-Making, established a global strategy for better lawmaking 




Increasingly, countries noted the importance of Better Regulation for 
competitiveness and economic growth (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2001, Cincera 
& Galgau 2005, Djankov et. al, 2006).  
In the European Spring Summit in Lisbon (march 2000), the quality of 
regulation become one the pillars of the EU's ambitious 'Lisbon Strategy' for 
growth and jobs. Subsequent summits gave the Commission a renewed 
mandate to develop "a strategy for further coordinated action to simplify the 
regulatory environment". In this phase the European approach differs from 
the American one as the emphasis is on laws rather than on executive acts 
and focuses on a broader analysis of all relevant impacts of policy options 
rather than on pure cost benefit analysis (Hahn & Litan 2005, Wiener 2006). 
However the Commission has also started to pay particular attention to 
partial impact analysis and to potential administrative costs and burdens 
resulting from EU law.  
In occasion of the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, this 
process resulted in a strong acceleration to the simplification process with 
the Commission communication 'Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in 
the EU', and the launch of the “Rolling Programme”
viii, initially covering the 
period 2005-2008. Since then, simplification effort have been considerably 
upgraded at Member State level. As the EU’s better regulation agenda is 
gradually being put into place, 19 Member States have introduced or are 
about to develop a Better Regulation Strategy and 12 Member states have 
identified this issue as a key challenge in their agenda.  
A coherent approach to a new culture of policy making requires an 
integrated approach including systematic simplification programmes, 
specific national targets, compliance incentives, regular consultation of 
stakeholders, monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, institutional structures 
which would allow for a rigorous implementation of the system
ix.  
However, action at national level has been limited to the setting up of 
better regulation tools, often without a real change in regulatory process 
and with limited impact on the business environment. The National Reform 
Programmes (NRP) evidenced that only few of the originally promising  
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simplification plans have already resulted in explicit measures. The 
contribution of stakeholders to the policy making process varies widely 
across the Member States and there is room for substantial improvement.  
Looking ahead, more promising results are expected from programmes 
aimed directly at reducing administrative costs. During 2006, the European 
Commission designed and launched an Act Programme for Reducing 
Administrative Burdens in the European Union (COM (2007)23). In 2007 the 
Programme was then endorsed by the Spring Council that specifically 
agreed to the joint reduction target of 25% of burdens by 2012 stemming 
from EU legislation and its transposition into national law. EU leaders agreed 
to this goal but discarded the idea of binding targets at national level. 
According to European Commission estimates, AB imposed by government 
(applications, forms, statistics) amount to around 3.5% of EU GDP, meaning 
that a 25% cut could produce a €150 billion boost to the European 
economy
x through saving for the enterprise system. 
The 9
th October 2007 the Council (Ecofin) Conclusions recalled the 
mandate on the reduction of administrative burdens and, in particular, 
underlined the importance of ensuring that the needs of SMEs and newly 
created enterprises are fully considered in this context. At the same time, 
“… the Presidency considers that the need for an adequate balance between 
costs and benefits should be taken into account  in the overall effort of 
measuring and reducing administrative burdens ...”. 
Following the mandate of the EU Council, the Commission started the 
implementation of the project
xi. The Action Programme will also examine 
how EU IO have been transposed into national legislation. For carrying out 
the above assignment, after a complex competitive procedure, the 
Commission awarded an important Service Contract to a Contractor 
xii. The 
project started in July 2007 and the measurement has been finalised during 
the course of 2008. The results of the EC measurement should be available 
to member states by the end of 2008, and the EC and the Contractor tried 
to organise themselves in order to achieve the important objectives 
foreseen, taking into account the complexity of the work and the very  
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limited timeframe considered for the assignment (18 months). At present a 
number of relevant issues are affecting the EC exercise, with particular 
reference to the relations between the activities of the Contractor and the 
contribution of the State members. There is the risk that they might hamper 
and jeopardise the EC exercise. In particular, taking into account the Italian 
case, these are the main  issues: 
•  It is still unclear what should be the exact contribution of the member 
state: indeed the Terms of Reference (ToR) provided by the EC make 
reference to the validation of the IO pre-mapping provided by the 
Contractor but it is not defined the in-depth of this activity. 
•  The ToR are vague about the degree to which national regulation were 
to be surveyed. There are hints that the Contractor suggests to 
consider only primary legislation as a source of AB. This would be 
misleading. Most details about the burdens are in secondary norms 
(Ministerial Decrees in particular) and excluding them from the 
mapping process may (have) deliver(-ed) a highly incomplete picture 
of the real AB. It must be remembered that within the SCM, details are 
the substance matter.  
•  There seems to be an important underestimation of the complexity of 
the SCM in terms of getting suitable data and information upon figures 
(quality and quantity of business) and the transposition in the country 
of the EC regulation. 
•  An important component of the transposition in the country of the EC 
regulation affecting companies is placed at regional and municipality 
level. At present s unclear how to manage this multi-level governance 
issue which is crucial in the Italian experience of implementing 
effectively the SCM method. 
 
At Member states level, the number of States which have set a 
quantitative target has doubled in 2007 with respect to the previous year 
(ten Member States, AT, DE, DK, EL, ES, IT, NL, SE, SK, UK have set a 25% 
national reduction target, while another two Member States, CZ and FR, set  
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a target of 20%). Most Member States have so far carried out baseline 
measurement of administrative burdens using the same measurement 
methodology (SCM), while others are currently conducting them (AT, DE, 
FR, SE). 
Italy agreed upon setting a national target for a reduction of 25%, to 
be achieved at national level (on regulation with “pure” national or regional 
origin) by 2012 
xiii. The importance and the commitment to this “national 
target” as part of the Italian simplification strategy has been improved by its 
adoption in primary legislation in august 2008 (art. 25 of Law 133/08). In 
particular all the national administrations are obliged to be part of the 
measurement exercise in order to achieve the EU and national targets. 
 
3. The Italian experience 
From June 2005 to November 2006, Italy completed its first pilot 
project (MOA - Misurazione oneri amministrativi) to test the Dutch Standard 
Cost Model. The project was coordinated by the Department of Public 
Administration (Office for Simplification in Public Administrations) in the 
Prime Minister Office, in collaboration with the Italian School of Public 
Administration (SSPA). On that occasion, MOA (or the SCM Italian version) 
was applied on 19 cases of permits and other administrative obligations for 
the exercise of business activities, in different economic sectors, such as 
“public procurement”, “annual reporting” (Olive oil production, Nurseries for 
vegetables), “Road freight transport” (in connection with the RTS OECD 
project), “naval transport”, VAT and privacy requirements for SMEs. 
At the beginning of 2007 and in connection with the first Italian Annual 
Simplification Plan, the Italian Government launched a new national Multi-
annual Plan (2007-2010) for the Measurement of Administrative Costs and 
quantitative reduction of AB for enterprises. The IOs arising for SMEs 
connected to national regulation (areas of Environment, Fire Security and 
prevention, Landscape Protection and Labour and Social Security) were 
selected on the basis of the simplification priorities expressed by Inter  
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Ministerial Committee in its Annual Action Plan, in consultation with 
stakeholders and taking into account the EC strategy. The Department of 
Public Administration and the Simplification Unit (PMO) coordinate the Plan. 
The National Statistic Office (ISTAT) is involved in the sample selection 
process, in the design of the method and the direct implementation of the 
measurement survey.  
The structure of the Italian SCM has changed quite considerably 
between the experimental phase and the actual implementation of the first 
program of measurement. This change follows directly from the lessons 
learned during the experimental phase. Two issues arose forcefully to the 
attention of the researchers. On one side the sheer size of the heterogeneity 
in the population of firms was reflected in a wide variety of estimates of the 
burden associated with a certain administrative activity. This was reduced 
by repeated interaction with the firms interviewed, but only to a limited 
extent. The ideal presented in the SCM manuals in which a 4 out of 5 firms 
were actually revealing comparable costs, whose average could therefore be 
deemed to be close to the cost of the ‘normally efficient business’, seldom 
occurred. 
This prompted another consideration about the particular structure of 
the Italian firms. Indeed, the existence of 4,5 millions registered SMEs (of 
which, around 4 million below 5 employees), makes the Italian situation 
almost unique. On one side this makes it more urgent for Italy to run an 
appropriate program of AB reduction. It is an accepted fact that the AB and 
more in general compliance costs, weights disproportionately on small firms 
mainly because there are economies of scale in the related activities. A 
country with fragmented firms’ structure therefore stands to gain potentially 
much more from cost reduction than one with a concentrated structure. AS 
a consequence  the Italian SCM program focused only on SMEs, on which all 
the substantial gains are to be found. In addition, due to the huge number 
of SME, it is unreasonable to suppose that it is possible to estimate the cost 
of the ‘normally efficient business’ once for all classes, with 5 interviews. 
Stratification of the population is clearly one answer. All Italian estimates  
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have been carried out only on SMEs and are based on two separate surveys. 
An indirect survey for firms for Micro firms (defined as firms with 1 to 5 
employees) and a direct one for larger SME (5-249 employees). Also a 
statistically sounder approach appeared necessary. 
Furthermore some problems arose in the sample selection process. 
Participation in the survey was difficult to secure in particular for micro 
firms. The easiest route to ensure a reasonable level of compliance was to 
obtain a backing of the initiative from business associations. However even 
then most small firms were unaware of the burdens associated with most 
administrative activities, simply because the vast majority of them were 
actually externalising all of the administrative activities. Notably, the most 
important providers of those services are the very business associations 
involved in the measurement. This prompted the consideration that a biased 
selection of the sample through business association might severely affect 
the credibility of the estimate. Of course, a similar problem of credibility 
exists when firms are directly chosen by the government and particularly if 
chosen by the regulatory agency. This is the reason why those tasks are 
better allocated to a third structure not directly involved neither to business 
association nor to the regulatory agency. In Italy this structure has been 
identified in the national statistic institute (ISTAT). This choice seemed to fit 
also the need to develop a sound statistical approach based on the 
representativeness of single firms interviewed in terms of their relevant 
characteristics. 
Externalising the survey did not solve the problem of micro firms, 
defined as the business with less than 5 employees (which actually weren’t 
able to answer the detailed questionnaire for the reasons above). Excluding 
micro firms from the survey would certainly deliver a biased results. The 
solution adopted has been to gather information on micro firms burdens 
indirectly, through ‘expert assessment’ and to aggregate the obtained 
estimates with the results delivered by ISTAT on the sample of single-
location firms from 5 to 249 employees.  
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Building a good quality, reliable sample, is one of the most difficult 
steps of the analysis. The sample size chosen for each regulatory area is 
about 40/50 firms. For simplicity, samples of the same size are taken for 
each measurement, independently from the subject regulation. The pilot 
project evidenced that in the Italian context, characterized by considerable 
heterogeneity in the population of firms, a sample of 4 or 5 firms was 
meaningless. In selecting the sample size, it must be taken into account 
that the time needed to investigate and correct the impact of outliers could 
largely exceed the time needed for conducting higher number of surveys.  
ISTAT selects the sample in two steps: first it conducts a basic 
telephone survey on a sufficiently large number of firms (roughly 1000 per 
regulatory area), distributed uniformly over the national territory. This 
survey is aimed at estimating the number and type of businesses that are 
required to comply with the specific activities involved. Companies are 
asked to provide information over the last three years, ending with 2006. 
This first step is also important to identify the relevant population when 
some IO do not involve the whole population of enterprises affected by the 
regulation but only firms that undertake some specific action (for ex. 
participating in a tender, opening a new venue or installing new equipment). 
The second step consists in direct interviews to a smaller number of 
businesses (40-50). Businesses are selected obviously among those that 
have complied with at least one administrative burden in the relevant year. 
The sample has been constructed using a balancing technique aimed at 
guaranteeing the presence of a minimum number of businesses for each 
region, type of administrative burden, size, presence of internal and 
external costs and sector of activity. A statistical model has been used to 
extrapolate results from the sample to the population. The model uses some 
auxiliary variables (number of enterprises, number of employees, sector of 
economic activity, geographic distribution) to assign a weight Wk for each 
enterprise k of the sample. Questionnaires and interviews guides were 
prepared for each regulation subject. The questionnaires were reviewed and 
discussed in a focus group before being sent out for use by the local statistic  
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office interviewers. Interviewers undertook a training programme to 
understand the purpose of the project and the way to collect information 
and complete the questionnaires. To facilitate measurements, reduce errors 
and ensure a greater homogeneity of the results,  national experiences 
show the value of a database and the importance to fix some “standard” 
value for recurrent costs (filling a form, posting it etc.). The same issue will 
most likely arise at the EU-level. 
ISTAT does not provide data on the appropriate wage for relevant 
occupational group. Eight employee types were identified as typically 
working in SMEs. The cost applied on each type is the average hourly wage 
provided by the same businesses interviewed, including a 25% uplift for 
overhead costs, in accordance with the SCM.  
External costs are the fees paid to external advisers, collected in the 
interviews with businesses and verified in a focus group with accountants 
and professional advisers. In particular, professionals can provide more 
information than businesses regarding the distribution of total costs among 
the specific administrative activities.  
In cases where the frequency was not identifiable in a prescribed 
mandatory periodicity, it was estimated on the basis of the occurrences 
revealed during the interviews, and verified on the basis of administrative 
information. The cost for each administrative burden is the sum of internal 
and external costs.  
The final aim of the methodology is to determine the administrative 
costs of a “typical” firm, that means avoiding the impact on the results of 
exceptional and not representative businesses on the estimate. The 
methodological issues and the criteria for identifying “abnormal” values, 
however, are not explicated in a satisfactory way in international SCM 
m a n u a l s .  T h e  c h o i c e  o f  v a l u e s  t h a t  h a v e  t o  b e  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h e  
measurement is largely discretional and can produce inconsistent and non-
homogeneous results. 
In Italy, in the first experimental phase the exclusion criterion chosen 
was a measure of the distance from the mean. This concept of “abnormal”,  
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borrowed from statistical theory, was only meant to provide a standard and 
homogeneous criterion to limit user discretion. In statistical terms however, 
the concept can be operatively better captured using the median (that, in 
general, is insensitive to “outliers”), rather than the average cost. However, 
for very small samples the median is a less reliable statistical indicator. 
ISTAT uses the median of the total burden, but calculates also average 
values to control and investigate for eventual excessive anomalies. 
The results of the first AB measurement in Italy, in the areas identified 
by the Italian Annual Simplification Plan (PAS) of 2007, are summarized in 
table 1
2. The estimate of the total administrative cost imposed to business 
by national regulation in the areas selected amount to over 16 billion euros 
per year. Most of these costs are concentrated in the areas of labour and 
social security. The administrative costs imposed by environment regulation 
amount to over 2 billion of euros. It must be noticed that these costs only 
include administrative burdens imposed by central government in the 
environmental sector, and do not take account of the significant burden 
imposed in this area by regulation at EU and at local level. 
 
Table 1 - Summary administrative cost by sector  
(thousand euro, year 2006) 
N. of employees 
Sector 
0-4 5-249  0-249 
Privacy  n.d. n.d.  2.190.431 
Environment  1.540.382 518.807  2.059.189 
Fire prevention  995.212 414.303  1.409.515 
Landscape and 
cultural goods 
550.817 70.583 621.400 
Labour  5.858.048 1.052.596  6.910.644 
                                                 






Social security  1.832.710 1.196.833  3.029.542 




4. A cross-country comparison of the application of the SCM method.  
4.1. Different approaches to measurement and the possibility to undertake 
a useful benchmark. 
 
The number of countries that use the SCM has grown significantly in 
the last few years. Despite all these countries apply the same technique, 
some countries have made deliberate choices to deviate from the original 
SCM standard in the application. As stressed by the Dutch manual itself, the 
method is not static and it is important to let the single elements in the 
method to be constantly developed in line with the method being employed 
in new areas or in relation to new problems. That is why the manual has to 
be considered as a reference to address the most general issues and, 
keeping intact the fundamental principles, it will be updated with the 
method’s continued development. In other terms the SCM is an open 
standard that can be, up to some points, customised or adapted to different 
circumstances. 
Understanding the different methodologies used to carry out the SCM 
measurement is critical for the purpose of making comparisons or 
benchmarking between countries. This section illustrates some of the most 
relevant decisions on a number of central matters that have to be taken 
before applying SCM, discusses the possible options in the application of the 
technique comparing the experiences of several European countries, and 
evidences and explains some Italian choices
 xiv.  
One of the most important points that must be addressed before 
starting comparison/benchmarking regards definitions. The definition of IO, 
regulation, business etc. is not obvious and need to be clarified. It is also  
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important to find an agreement on what has to be measured and what can 
be neglected, and on the way data have to be collected and reported. 
First of all, since the SCM is aimed at measuring the administrative 
costs for private businesses, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by 
private businesses. The definition of private business is also necessary to 
identify the size of the population to be affected by a given rule. The 
traditional and narrow definition of private business is: “units that produce 
and/or supply goods and/or services under market conditions with the 
objective of generating profit for the owners”. While Denmark, Sweden and 
Italy have employed this narrow definition of private businesses other 
countries have chosen a broader definition of “private business”, including 
also “semiprivate” businesses, like charities and the voluntary sector (UK) or 
also public or partly public owned businesses that cover its own costs. 
(Netherlands). Norway extended the narrow definition to state corporations 
that perform regular business activities.  
Differences among countries also arise in the definition of the 
regulation, whose administrative costs have to be measured. These 
differences are mainly due to differences in legal and political systems. In 
some countries, where a great part of the regulatory burden comes from 
non-legislative regulation (as approved codes of practice in UK, non-
statutory schemes or agreements which the government has chosen to back 
rather than regulating), also part of these costs are included in the 
measurement. In Italy, as in the Netherlands and Denmark, the SCM is 
designed to measure the administrative costs arising from legislation 
(primary or secondary) only.  
Another issue concerns the decision to measure the EU-Regulations 
when domestic implementation is not required. Most countries measure only 
EU regulation that are implemented in national legislation. This is not 
necessarily the most rational choice (in many cases also EU regulation that 
is formally directly applicable needs some domestic implementation) but is 
surely less resource demanding than the option of measuring all EU  
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Regulations. The UK decided to list and flag even if not to measure all EU 
regulation. 
Different approaches were chosen also on whether to measure 
voluntary regulation or not. In principle, SCM should measure only 
administrative costs of compulsory regulations. Italy decided not to measure 
voluntary rules. However, there are cases in which rules are voluntary in 
theory but may be considered necessary in relation to entry, permanence or 
competition on the market, e.g. public procurement. Some countries 
(Denmark, Norway) measure the “necessary” voluntary rules, identified as 
the rules observed by the majority of the businesses that are covered by it. 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Netherlands measure all voluntary rules.  
Another decision that varies among countries regards the choice of 
measuring businesses’ IOs to the public sector only or including third parties 
information obligations (like employees or consumers, ex. food labelling of 
products, financial prospectus). Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and 
Sweden have measured both types of information obligations, while Italy 
(so far) and the United Kingdom only measure information obligations to the 
public sector. 
In order to measure businesses’ administrative costs of regulations, it 
is important to establish clear assumptions about compliance. Not always a 
regulation is complied in full by all the businesses for which it is relevant. It 
may happen that the legislation is misunderstood by the businesses, or that 
the businesses consciously fail to follow parts of the provisions of the 
regulation. In these cases the costs of complying with a regulation may be 
different from the costs that the businesses actually incur. Most countries 
have decided to measure full compliance, with the aim to capture how 
businesses are supposed to follow the rule and what costs these businesses 
would bear in following all the rules that they are required to. Netherlands 
privileges the full compliance principle, but also measures with actual 
compliance when statistics about actual compliance are available. In 
carrying out their experimental measures, Italy has tried when possible to 
compare the measures obtained basing on actual compliance with those  
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under the hypothesis of full compliance (that are the centrepiece of the 
analysis anyway). The extent of the difference between the two measures 
can provide some further suggestion about the opportunity to simplify the 
regulation. When the businesses fail to comply with the regulation because 
it is too complex to be understood completely, or because is too “irritant to 
businesses”, simplification of the rules can meet the double goal of reducing 
information costs and increasing the efficacy of the rule and the number of 
businesses that will comply with all parts of it.  
In the cases where businesses receive some form of reimbursement of 
the administrative costs, it must be decided whether to include these costs 
in the measurement. Some countries, as Denmark, decided to exclude from 
the measurement IOs with cost-determined reimbursement. Other countries 
considers all IOs, but keep track of the level of reimbursement in order to 
take account of this information in the administrative cost measurements 
and to include such regulations on a net basis (United Kingdom, 
Netherlands). Including all IOs on a gross basis and reporting separately the 
size of reimbursement allows the evaluation both of the total impact of 
information obligations and the distribution of this impact between private 
businesses and the public sector. In Italy the issue is irrelevant: it is difficult 
to find cases in which businesses subjected receive such reimbursement.  
It must be noticed that sometimes, the reduction of AB for firms could 
lead to an increase of cost for the public sector. In these cases where 
motivation of public interest would hinder or limit the possibility to reduce 
the burden for businesses simplifying the regulation, the reimbursement can 
be considered as a policy option to reduce the impact of AB on businesses.  
Some countries use the SCM model to calculate the administrative 
costs to other groups than businesses, typically citizens and public 
authorities (the Netherlands for example). The approach used is similar to 
that used for businesses, but the analysis covers different aspects and may 




As evidenced above, one of the most difficult steps of the SCM analysis 
is to determine the administrative costs of a “typical” firm
xv. The choice of 
the typical firm is aimed to avoid the impact on the results of exceptional 
and not representative businesses on the estimate. The methodological 
issues at the basis of identification and exclusion of abnormal values from 
the estimate are not explicated to a satisfactory point in international 
manuals. Italy, as other countries, use the median rather than the average 
cost.  
As it happens this increases the importance of building a good quality 
sample of businesses to derive costs for a typical firm. Random samples 
have to be avoided. A sample that is statistically representative of the 
population affected by the regulation is not to be considered because the 
costs of constructing such a sample (and performing the survey) would 
greatly overcome the simplification potential. Moreover, the time involved 
would not be consistent with the time frame of the analysis. 
In order to tackle the problem, some countries decided not to measure 
observations under a defined threshold limit. The criteria used to select the 
sample and the way each country account for these criteria differ among 
countries.  
Denmark has set a lower threshold limit: laws which involve less than 
100 hours administrative work per year for all businesses concerned are not 
measured. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden have not set a 
formal threshold limit. Italy has not set a threshold limit on single 
parameters of the measurement, but has set a dimensional threshold limit 
of the businesses involved in the analysis. In a first stage the measurement 
will be carried out only on SMEs (up to 249 employee). The exclusion of 
large firms, is motivated partly by the structure of the firm population in 
Italy, where large firms are a negligible minority (less than 10,000 units). 
But mostly by the large amount of evidence in support of a regressive 
impact of AB. According to this view, red tape and compliance costs more in 
general are to some extent fixed costs and therefore weight more heavily on 
smaller firms
xvi.   
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The “overhead costs”, the costs related to other factors than labour 
and that cover necessities linked to general administration (expenses for 
premises - rent or building depreciation -, telephone, heating, electricity, IT 
equipment, absence owing to illness etc.) are not easy to identify as there is 
no central statistical source that provides the necessary information. The 
overhead percentage varies among countries. Italy used an overhead 
percentage of 25 %, in analogy to other countries (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). The Netherlands uses sometimes higher percentages. 
In practice the SCM measures all administrative costs. Separating 
administrative costs from costs a company would incur also in absence of 
legislation (the “normal” business costs) would be too difficult to implement 
and it would not add much to the simplification process. Most countries have 
chosen not to make a formal distinction between normal business costs and 
administrative costs.  Norway separate administrative costs from normal 
costs.  
Different countries also use different approaches to assess if 
simplification succeeded in reducing administrative burden. The time horizon 
needed for simplification targets to be met is usually fixed more or less in 
three years. The frequency of the monitoring process differs among 
countries: the Netherlands carry out two monitoring exercises a year in 
order to know in advance if the targets are likely to be met in three years. 
Denmark intends to conduct annual measurements. The United Kingdom will 
use ex-ante assessments of new regulation as part of the post-
implementation review process after three years. 
 
 
4.2. Possible challenges in the use of the methodology to measure 
administrative costs. 
 
The first step of the measurement consists in identifying the IOs 
inherent to the law under examination. These IOs may be further split into a 
number of pieces of information known as messages. In order to produce  
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this information, the businesses have to carry out a range of administrative 
activities that require internal resource in the form of use of employees’ 
time and external resources in the form of fees for auditors, external 
experts and so on. Despite the basic calculations to determine the 
administrative costs for businesses are quite simple, the way to proceed to 
the measurement may be not so trivial and may differ among countries, 
leading to non-homogeneous results.  
The basic formula for calculating the costs for the administration is 
quite simple: 
 
Σ (Price x Quantity) 
 
where the Price P represents the costs the companies incur in 
performing the activities, that is the product of Tariff x Time; the Tariff T, is 
the internal cost, that corresponds to the wage costs plus overhead for 
administrative activities done internally and the external cost, that is the 
hourly cost for external services providers; the Time required for carrying 
out the administrative activity, measured in hours (h). The variable Q 
represents the total time businesses spend each year to perform the 
administrative activities necessary to deliver the specific data requirement. 
It corresponds to the frequency that the activity must be completed each 
year multiplied by the size of the population of businesses affected. 
Together P and Q add up to a certain cost for businesses when complying 
with each information obligation contained in the law under examination. 
In theory, the more details, the better. In practice, while complying 
with IO, companies carry out a number of activities that are sometimes 
difficult to distinguish. The cost of performing certain activities, P, especially 
when administrative processes are outsourced to external service providers 
(such as tax consultants, notaries, lawyers) is often available only in 
aggregate form, making it difficult to separate tariff and time. Germany 
suggests that in these cases the tariff of external providers shall be taken as 
a basis for calculation. However, the tariffs of these providers are generally  
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defined for a specific service (better, on a whole “package” of activities) and 
not on a time basis. Italy collects information regarding external costs in 
interviews with businesses and verify costs and their distribution among 
specific administrative activities in a focus group with professional advisors. 
External costs are summed up with internal costs and a total cost is 
calculated for each activity. This method, used in other countries, does not 
allow to have separate estimates of the average internal and external time 
needed to perform a specific activity.  
In the first experimental phase Italy has also explored some method to 
separate average values for internal and external cost
xvii.  
In the case external costs are available in aggregate and it would not 
be possible to obtain the hourly rate of the service provider, the costs of 
















































where nt is the total number of firms that provide information useful for 
calculation, ni is the number of firms that declared to use internal resources 
and ne is the number of firms that declared to use external resources. Note 
that nt may be lower than ni+ne if some firms in the sample use both 
internal and external resources.  
Data gained through the interviews and judged not reliable and valid, 
should be omitted. The SCM manual does not clearly explain whether all 
data of the “inefficient” company have to be omitted from the analysis or 
only the specific values (for example, only time is to be omitted if the tariff 
is judged to be consistent with that declared by other firms in the group). 
This second hypothesis seems to be preferred in the need of economize the 
data collected. In this case, the total number of observation used to derive  
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the “typical” tariff may differ from the number of observations valid to 
calculate the typical time in hours and both of them may be lower than the 
total number of firms who provides information (nt).  
The median is a much easier instrument than the mean to deal with 
mathematical issues as those indicated above, as well as being a more 
reliable tool for identifying the cost of a "typical" business. 
 
4.3. Coordinating units and monitoring groups. 
 
Eventually, the success of SCM methodology depends crucially on the 
presence and effectiveness of a central coordinating unit. This unit has the 
important role of setting the timetable and giving support and cooperation 
to consultants and departments for solving methodological issues. It is 
responsible of ensuring that the method is consistently applied by the 
consultants and in maintaining a good cooperation between the consultants 
and the departments.  
Among the bodies charged with the responsibility of the SCM 
measurements are: the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency (division 
for Better Business Regulation) in Denmark, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in Norway, the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands, the Swedish 
Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Nutek) in Sweden. 
In the United Kingdom, the Better Regulation Executive that co-
ordinates the SCM measurements, previously part of the Cabinet Office, is 
now part of the new Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform. This new Department inherits functions from the former 
Department of Trade and Industry, and bears responsibility for creating the 
conditions for business success through competitive and flexible markets 
and regulatory reform. It works across Government and with the regions to 
raise the levels of UK productivity. 
In Italy the, the two main “drivers” of Better Regulation are both part 
of the Prime Minister’s Office. These are the Minister for Normative 
Simplification, with the support of the Simplification Unit, and the Minister  
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for Public Administration and Innovation, with the support of the 
administrative simplification office. The former has the political responsibility 
and the overall competence for better regulation, and, in particular, for the 
implementation of the cutting-laws mechanism and for the regulatory 
reduction of burdens. The latter has the political responsibility for 
administrative simplification, measurement and  administrative reduction of 
burdens, technological innovation, the reform and the modernization of 
public administration. The two bodies operates in a framework of strong 
cooperation. 
To guarantee the success of SCM method and the accountability and 
comparability of the results, it would also be important to establish a 
monitoring group or unit, with the mission to follow, monitor and validate 
the results of the measurement. This group should involve, in addition to 
the central coordinating unit, representatives from the relevant departments 
and from business and businesses organisations. 
 
 
5. The SCM: some problems and some advantages. 
Administrative burdens are usually defined as the information costs of 
regulation. The concept of IO is defined in opposition to substantive 
obligation stemming from regulation. Of course, focussing on information 
requirements set in the regulation can be justified on practical grounds for 
its relative simplicity. Getting data on the time needed for complying with 
paperwork obligation is certainly much simpler than calculating the whole 
compliance costs. Another reason is that paperwork is only indirectly linked 
to benefits and, as we will see later, this is linked to another basic 
assumption of the model: some burdens can be cut without affecting the 
benefit from regulation. Then, IO are in most cases instrumental to ensuring 
actual substantive compliance. But in some cases it may be reasonable to 
assume that compliance is virtually unaffected. 
Notably this is the case in at least three instances:  
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•  Some paperwork requirement may be redundant because the Public 
Administration already owns a certain piece of information. In this case 
a better integration (information sharing between different 
administrative bodies, unification and centralization of information 
collection) within the PA at different levels may preserve the same 
compliance with less paperwork and information burden for the 
business sector. 
•  Digitalization of administrative processes decreases paperwork and 
time waste without losses for compliance. 
•  A shift from controls across the board to a risk based approach may 
cut burdens were they are less likely to be productive in terms of 
increased compliance. Of course in this case the assumption of zero-
effects on benefit is less tenable. But if the shift is accompanied by 
increased penalties for non compliance it may be reasonable. 
 
Limiting attention to IOs is certainly a simplification of the task for the 
estimate of the burden. On the other side in some cases it may be difficult 
to define clearly whether a certain cost stems from an information obligation 
or not. A typical case is that of taxes or fees (transfers in general). In 
general this type of payments are excluded from the estimate of the SCM 
that is normally an estimate of the time needed to provide an obligation. 
Businesses can certainly hire (and often do it) an external professional to 
carry out the administrative activities necessary for an IO. But even in this 
case the estimate of the burden is based on the time (and a standard salary 
rate, with all the connected operational problems for the assessment) 
needed to carry out the activities that is often indeed been asked to the 
professional itself. 
The exclusion of payments to the public administration however may 
be unsatisfactory some times. In some cases payments to the PA are 
justified explicitly by the need to finance efficient oversight. For example, in 
the Italian regulation of fire prevention, firms are required to pay a 
compulsory fee that finances an ‘on site inspection’ necessary to ensure that  
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regulation has been duly complied with. In some sense, the firm acquires 
the services of the PA to ensure that it complies with existing regulation. 
This payment is therefore a possible substitute for a payment to a private 
sector professional certifying the due compliance. In this case, 
paradoxically, a literal application of the SCM excluding the fee will no doubt 
underestimate the true cost of information exchanges between the business 
and the PA. A PA relying heavily on direct control will perform better in 
terms of administrative burdens than a PA relying on self certification. In 
our experience however this is hardly a good indicator of a less burdensome 
system. 
Another potential problem with the definition of AB lies with the 
restriction of attention to the costs directly shouldered by businesses. While 
originally the definition of business was taken to include only strictly private 
and for-profit firms, according to most experts also non-profit and even 
some public organizations should be included in the measurement (in 
particular those providing services for tariff/charges). More importantly 
however concentrating on the direct costs to businesses may deliver an 
incomplete picture of the overall burdens of regulation. On one side the 
costs are not the sole type of burden incurred by businesses. During the 
implementation of the Italian measurement, businesses often complain 
about the delays of the PA in delivering permits for example. Thus, the 
simple cost dimension of the overall burden to the business system is an 
incomplete description as it overlooks the cost of delays and the uncertainty 
caused in the business operation. 
Moreover there may be a trade-off between the cost to business and 
other categories of costs. Again Self-certification and Certification obtained 
by endorsed professionals are often used as substitutes for direct controls of 
the PA. The motivation is often that of “speeding the process”. However 
both these modalities of regulation probably increase administrative burdens 
narrowly defined as direct costs, relative to a centralized system of controls 
that is necessarily more burdensome for the PA and are anyway more costly  
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in terms of delays for the business itself. In this respect the measurement 
may be misleading because incomplete. 
Of course within the logic of the SCM, the benefits of the regulation 
under examination are not to be considered. Policy-makers should judge 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs of the regulation after the 
measurement has been carried. 
Focusing on business is one of the pillars of the tool and sustaining and 
supporting private business through a lighter regulation can be assessed as 
a basic value for the policy maker. In the real world and when dealing with a 
large number of stakeholders, anyone with different strategic objective, the 
above can turn out as a weak point for the analyst who might miss or 
receive biased basic information for implementing an effective policy in line 
with the social welfare function of the society as a whole (see also Radaelli, 
2007). Here comes the problem of deciding what is really “disproportionate 
and irritant to business”: when implementing a measurement of 
controversial regulation where there are different stakeholders, assessing 
the threshold of proportionality and irritability can be difficult without 
precise information coming from the policy maker. 
At the same time another key for implementing SCM is connected to 
the fact that any income that businesses may generate through the IO 
should be disregarded. This is something that might occur in the actual 
implementation and cannot be underestimated. Then, eventually, the 
definition of AB disqualifies lost turnover from being deemed an AB. 
According to the manuals, only costs that have actually been made in order 
to satisfy a statutory information obligation count as AB. In this respect, the 
picture provided by the measurement can be considered incomplete even 
for business, in terms of not considering the opportunity costs of the 
resources of the company involved in providing the compliance to 
regulation. 
All the above are weak points of the SCM, directly linked to the 
pragmatic nature of the methodology. It is evident that only an appropriate 
Cost benefit Analysis (CBA) delivers a satisfactory evaluation of net benefits  
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maintaining a high level of transparency. The logic of CBA is that a 
community has limited resources and decision-makers must convey them 
towards the interventions capable of maximizing the net benefit for the 
community as a whole (and not only for a sub-set, the business). A 
transparent benefit-cost framework is best adapted to encompass a broad 
range of interests (social – economic- environmental impacts). However the 
hypothesis of implementing a fully fledged CBA on the whole of the existing 
regulation in a given country wouldn’t be feasible (nor pass itself the CBA 
test probably), while a complete evaluation of AB, given the more limited 
scope and more pragmatic methodological approach of the analysis, has 
been already implemented in some countries. The current move of 
regulatory impact analysis toward more soft forms of CBA and toward an 
increase in partial analysis does not depend uniquely on dissatisfaction with 
formal CBA. As underlined by Jacobs (2006), the increase in partial analysis 
reflect the growing pressures on governance from the many groups of 
interests. Different sources of interest lead to different goals and kinds of 
analysis. SCM is mainly driven by competitiveness issues. 
The main advantage and logic of the SCM however lies probably not in 
its formal properties but in its ability to deliver results. An important aspect 
of the properties of different tools of regulation is their practical ability to 
achieve their formal goal in the face of real world obstacles to their 
achievement and hence their efficacy rather than their theoretical efficiency. 
In this perspective the various instruments can and need to be evaluated 
not only for their formal properties but also for their chances of success in a 
given institutional and political system. In our opinion the main advantages 
of the SCM are to be found within this class of reasons. A tool for regulatory 
quality may be in theory the most efficient but it may be liable to biases or 
encounter problems in its application that undermine its desirability ex-ante. 
There are at least two types of obstacles that are very relevant: the 
resistance of the administration (or more generally vested interest that 
promote stricter regulation) and the difficulty in maintaining simplification 
policies at a high level in the political agenda. On both grounds the SCM is  
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more likely to succeed than other tools. On the first account the SCM is a 
rather rigid tool. Given the quantitative nature of the evaluation and the 
limited need for ad hoc hypotheses it is more difficult to bend it to other 
purposes.  
On the second account the strength of the SCM lies again in the 
commitment it requires to cut red tape. Once the 25% target is agreed and 
made public, it becomes a sensible target for politicians (and burocrats as 
well). Of course the fundamental tenets to achieve accountability of 
governments is their stability over a sufficient time horizon. Taking this 
requirement for granted however the 25% cut goal, mostly for its 
quantitative nature, requires a stronger commitment than any other target 
in the field of regulatory quality (Coco, 2006). 
The Italian case provides an example of the capacity of the SCM to 
enhance political commitment to simplification policies. The Italian 
measurement of AB in the 5 areas identified by the PAS 2007 were 
completed - and the most burdensome procedures to be “cut”, identified - in 
the first months of 2008, just before the election. The impending change of 
government had left the process in limbo, raising strong concerns about the 
possibility to complete the simplification. Contrary to pessimistic 
expectations, the new government has not only attached great importance 
to the results of the work, but has strengthened and accelerated the 
simplification process. 
In few weeks the Government has given a strong acceleration to 
measures of normative simplification and administrative burdens’ reduction, 
with Law decree No. 112/08, converted into l. 133/2008. 
The law decree includes also concrete simplification measures for the 
labour area, consistent with the measurement results. According to first 
estimates, the cut would allow firms to save over 4 billions of euros, about 
58% of the total administrative costs of the old procedures (quantified in 
6,9 billions of euros). 
 
6. Conclusions  
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The analysis of SCM in Europe and of the most significant experience of 
Member States demonstrates the potential of this methodology in promoting 
simplification policies and in supporting a new culture of policy making. The 
Italian experience confirms this potential but raises some methodological 
and substantial concerns on the validity of the SCM as a “stand-alone tool” 
to evaluate the impact of administrative requirements on enterprises and 
consequent interventions for burden reduction. 
In particular, some points that we have raised and have to be duly 
considered follow: 
•  the SCM provides an advantage in terms of potential for commitment 
of the policy maker to simplification and regulatory quality policies. 
•  It is a flexible tool but it allows international comparison and 
benchmarking more than other alternatives. As such it is more likely to 
be useful in the EU where many countries implement the same 
regulation with different outcomes in terms of AB. Nonetheless 
benchmarking presupposes uniformity of the method applied, which as 
explained above is not always the case. 
•  Its pragmatic approach allows in theory full measurement of the AB 
from the whole regulatory system in a country (at a non negligible 
cost, though). This would be unthinkable with alternative tools. 
•  On the other hand it is an incomplete instrument. Benefits are ignored 
altogether and this may lead to big mistakes in the wrong hands. 
•  AB may be a misleading measure even of the real overall burden to a 
business. Letting aside other categories of compliance costs, for 
example costs stemming from delays are entirely ignored. 
•  The method suffers from the possibility of wide variation in the AB 
measured in connection with fundamental choices of regulatory policy 
(direct regulatory body control vs. self/self certification), and the 
structure of the State (centralized approach vs. federal state). In both 
cases the use of the results for comparison among countries may be 
misleading as measurement may be biased.  
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•  According to manuals and implemented activities carried out so far, 
the number of businesses to be surveyed for the analysis are very 
limited in comparison to the universe of businesses (for instance, in 
I t a l y  o v e r  4 . 4  m n  S M E s ) .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  w h a t  i s  r e a l l y  a  
“representative sample” and how we are going to select a normally 
efficient business. In this respect there are still, too many hidden 
assumptions. 
•  When measuring administrative costs and assessing AB, the analysts 
should consider that different pieces of legislation on businesses are 
coming out from different level of government: in Italy, there is the EU 
level, the national level, the regional and municipal level for regulation 
on businesses. In this respect, for a homogeneous measurement, 
there is a need to come to a common model. 
 
The discussion on each point above has been undertaken both at a 
general methodological level and, more importantly, considering the wide 
variety of solutions that each problem has received in different European 
countries. Taking into consideration all the above, our conclusion is that the 
SCM is a powerful tool for simplification. However it should be considered as 
an important component of a Global Programme, with a number of further 
tools needed to complement it, aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of 






This paper gives account of some indication arisen during the realization of 
the project for measurement of administrative burdens through SCM in Italy 
in which the authors have been involved. The authors thank Pia Marconi and 
Silvia Paparo, the coordinators of the Italian measurement project for the 
Department for Public Administration for promoting a good and stimulating 
work environment encouraging and supporting constructing discussion. We 
also thank members of the SSPA task force (S. Barbieri, M.G. Cosentino, B. 
Marchetti, N. Rangone, F. Sarpi) for their contribution to the discussion that 
led to the development of some of the ideas expressed in this paper and the 
National Statistic Office (ISTAT) for the important role in the measurement 
and the development of the model. We  would like to thank also participants 
to the VII Global Conference on Business & Economics held in Rome in 
October 2007, and to the IV Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law 
and Economics for useful comments. Finally a special thank is due to 
Claudio Radaelli for useful insights on a previous version of the paper that 
helped refocusing it. Mistakes are entirely the authors’ responsibility. The 
opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 




Blanchard O.J., F.Giavazzi (2001) Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and 
Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets. NBER working papers, No. 8120. 
Cincera M., O.Galgau (2005) Impact of market entry and exit on EU 
productivity and growth performance. European Economy, Directorate 
General Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Papers N. 222, February. 
Coco, G. (2007) La misurazione degli oneri amministrativi tramite Standard 
Cost Model Economia Pubblica, n. 1-2, pp. 37-52. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union 
{SEC(2005) 175}, {COM(2005)97 final}. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions COM(2006) 689: A strategic review of Better 
Regulation in the European Union. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Council: Strategic 
report on the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs: launching the 
new cycle (2008-2010),  COM(2007) 803 final. 
Council of the EU, Annex to Note a progress report on Better Regulation, 
November 2007, pag. 4. 
Djankov S. McLiesh and C. Ramalho R. (2006) Regulation and growth, 
World bank, March 2006. 
European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines SEC(2005)791 (Rev. 
2006).  
European Commission, Commission Working Document: Measuring 
administrative costs and reducing administrative burdens in the European 
Union ({COM(2006) 691 final}. 
European Commission, Commission Working Document – Reducing AB in 
the EU 2007 progress report and 2008 outlook, COM(2008) January 2008, 
final. 
European Commission, Integrated Guidelines for growth and jobs (2005-
2008) {COM(2005) 141 final} 
European Parliament Council Commission Inter-institutional Agreement on 
better law-making, (2003/C, 321/01) Official Journal of the European Union    
33 
33
German SCM manual, Introduction of the Standard Cost Model Methodology 
Manual of the Federal Government, Federal Statistical Office, 2006. 
Hahn, R. W., R. E. Litan (2005) Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: 
Lessons for the US and Europe, Journal of International Economic Law, 
Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), 473-508, June. 
Jacobs, Scott (2006) Current Trends in Regulatory  Impact Analysis: The 
Challenges of Mainstreaming RIA into Policy-making, Jacobs and Associates, 
30 May 2006. 
OECD (2003) From red tape to smart tape: administrative simplification in 
OECD countries, Paris. 
OECD (2006) Cutting Red Tape: national strategies for administrative 
simplification OECD publishing, Paris. 
OECD (2007) Comparing Administrative Burdens across Countries’ OECD, 
Paris  
Radaelli, C. M. (2007) Whither better regulation for the Lisbon Agenda? 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 14, 2, 2007, pp190-207 
Radaelli, C.M. (2007) Cracking down on administrative burdens: why 
business is not latching on, Federalismi.it, n.14/2007 
Radaelli, C. M., F. De Francesco (2007) Regulatory quality in Europe, 
Concepts, Measures and Policy Processes, Manchester University Press. 
RIA manual: Dutch assessment of proposed regulation; explanatory notes, 
step-by-step plan, quick scan, manuals, Ministry of Economic Affairs, The 
Hague, August 2004 
SCM Network (2005) Delivering reductions in administrative burdens: An 
executive summary of the SCM method. 
SCM Manual: The Standard Cost Model; A framework for defining and 
quantifying administrative burdens for businesses, International SCM 
network, The Hague, August 2004 
The International SCM Manual; measuring and reducing administrative 
burdens for businesses, October 2005 
Torriti, Jacopo (2007) The Standard Cost Model: when better regulation 
fights against red-tape in: Weatherill, Stephen, ed., Better Regulation 
(Oxford: Hart).  
34 
34
UK Standard Cost Model Manual, Measuring Administrative Costs: UK 
Standard Cost Model Manual, Cabinet Office, Better Regulation Executive, 
2005. 
Wiener, Jonathan B. (2006) Better Regulation in Europe, Duke Law School 
Legal Studies Paper No. 130, Duke University  










                                                 
i   Notably the OECD’s PMR and the Word Bank’s Doing business. 
ii   The SCM Network (http://www.administrative-burdens.com/) is an informal network of 
countries who use the standard cost model to measure and simplify their 
administrative burdens. All countries which use or are thinking of using the standard 
cost model can join the network, that currently involves: Australia-Victoria, Austria, 
Belgium, Flanders (Belgium), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden,  and the United Kingdom. 
iii   Annex to the Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the 
European Union Minimising administrative costs imposed by legislation, Detailed 
outline of a possible EU Net Administrative Cost Model {COM(2005)97 final} 
iv   “The Standard Cost Model - A framework for defining and quantifying administrative 
burdens for businesses (August 2004 ver.)” 
v   European Commission, Commission Working Document – Reducing AB in the EU 2007 
progress report and 2008 outlook, COM(2008) January 2008, final. 
vi        COM (2002)278) 
vii   OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, 
viii   (“Implementing the Community Lisbon programme : A strategy for the simplification 
of the regulatory environment  COM (2005) 0535 
ix   For a discussion of the institutional determinants of regulatory quality see Radaelli and 
De Francesco (2007). 
x  Commission working document COM(2006) 691: "Measuring administrative costs and 
reducing administrative burdens in the European Union"; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2006) 689 : "A strategic 
review of Better Regulation in the European Union". 
xi   Accordingly, the Communication COM(2006) 691  states that, “ … the Action 
Programme focuses on mapping, measuring and removing IO imposed on businesses 
that have proven to be obsolete, redundant or repetitive: its aim is to improve the  
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effectiveness of legislation in 13 priority areas without jeopardizing its basic objectives 
...”. 
xii   The Contractor is composed by 3 partners: Deloitte Touche 
(http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/home/0,1044,sid%253D2774,00.html), CapGemini 
(http://www.capgemini.com/) and Ramboll 
(http://www.ramboll.com/eng/mainpage.htm). The work of the Contractor has already 
started and the authors had the chance to meet personnel in charge for the 
measurement in Italy and verify the status of the project.  
xiii   Council of the EU, Annex to Note a progress report on Better Regulation, November 
2007, pag. 4. 
xiv       in particular Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and Norway. Also see specific countries’ 
manuals and in particular the Appendix to the UK SCM manual 
xv   What manuals term a ‘normally efficient business’. 
xvi   The overall estimate will not change substantially if larger firms were added. On the 
other side as they may bear substantially different costs they need to be surveyed 
separately increasing substantially the cost of the survey. On the whole the final aim of 
the SCM exercise is to cut firms’ administrative burdens. It makes therefore sense to 
concentrate on those firms for which AB make a difference. 
xvii       More information are available from the authors upon request. 